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Compo Company Limited v. Blue Crest Music Inc. et al 
(1980) 1 S.C.R. 357.
INTRODUCTION
Compo Company was sued for making records. This can be an 
infringement o f copyright under the Copyright Act. 1 The involvement of 
the company was limited to pressing copies from a master acetate pro­
vided by Canusa Records, the company which had done the actual studio 
work and marketed to the public the records pressed by Compo. Compo 
was held to be making records.
Copyright in Canada is a purely statutory righ t2 which, in any 
literary, artistic, dramatic or musical work, is regarded as a bundle of 
rights.3 In the case of a musical work these rights include the right to 
publish an unpublished work, the right to reproduce the work in sheet 
music form (the “graphic” right), the right to perform  the work in public, 
the right to communicate the work by radio communication, and the 
right
to make any record, perforated roll, cinematograph film, or other contrivance 
by means o f  which the work may be mechanically performed or delivered.4
This last right has been called the “mechanical” right5 though the 
mechanisms needed to perform the work include devices of an electrical 
or magnetic nature. The records or contrivances used today are usually 
discs, tapes or film sound tracks. It was the mechanical right that was in 
issue in the Compo case.
A person who violates these rights is an infringer irrespective of his 
knowledge o f their existence.6
*lbul., ai s. 3(1) (d). Another right is to authorize any of the above-listed acts.
*Or the "nm  hanu al" and ‘'synchronization" right, the latter pertaining to films and television.
*lbul.. at s. 17(1); com pare with s. 17(4).
'Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30.
2lbul.. at s. 45.
3!bui.. at s. 3( 1V
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The different rights which make up copyright may be separately 
assigned and licensed to different people7 but in the Compo case it 
appears that the plaintiffs owned the entire copyright in the musical 
work in question, a work entitled “T here Goes My Everything.”
Copyright in a musical work did not, historically, always include all 
the rights mentioned above. The mechanical right first received statutory 
recognition in the United States in 19098 and in England in 19119, and 
in both countries the legislation which conferred the mechanical right 
simultaneously watered it down by providing for a system of compulsory 
licensing.10 The reason for this was that before the introduction of the 
mechanical right, record m anufacturers had been able to make records 
of musical works without payment to any copyright owner. When it was 
suggested that the copyright laws should be amended to require them to
Cay, many record m anufacturers feared that they would be put out of usiness, and that control over the making o f records would fall into the 
hands of a few powerful firms.11 Provision was therefore made in the 
copyright legislation of the U.S. and England to enable anyone to obtain 
a license to make records, on payment of compensation to the owner of 
the mechanical right, if the owner had himself made records or permitted 
someone else to do so. This scheme was adopted in Canada in 192112 
when the mechanical right was introduced into Canadian copyright leg­
islation. The mechanical right was defined in the same way as it had 
been in England in 1911, and the language of the Canadian compulsory 
licensing section (now s. 19) was similar to the corresponding English 
provisions. By the statute the royalty payable to the copyright owner was 
fixed at two cents for each playing surface, perforated roll or other 
contrivance.
The license obtained pursuant to s. 19 may be called a compulsory 
license or, as the Supreme Court preferred to call it in the Compo case,
7Ibtd.. at s. 12(4). Thus, it is usual to transfer the public perform ing right (other than the "grand” right 
for dramatic performances) to a society which collects and administers such rights, usually CAPAC or 
PRO Canada; the other rights may be assigned to a music publisher, who mav license record manufac­
turers, frequently through an agent such as the Harry Fox Agency or C'.MRRA (the Canadian Musical 
Reproduction Rights Agency Limited, who applied, unsuccessfully, for leave to intervene in the Compo 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada).
'U.S. Copyright Act of March 4. 1909, s. 1(e), conferring, inter alia, the exclusive right, in the case of 
a musical composition, “to make . . .  any form of record in which the thought ot an author ma\ be 
recorded and from which it may be read or reproduced " in the Compo case, the Supreme 0>urt 
referred to s. 101(e) of this 1909 Act, which referred to “Unauthorized manufacture" of discs etc. for 
use in mechanical music-producing machines.
*1 and 2 Geo. 5, c. 46, s. 1(2) (</), in the same terms as Canadian s. 3(1) (rf).
‘•U.S. Copyright Act of March 4. 1909. s. 1(f); 1 and 2 Oeo. 5, c. 46. s. 19(2)(7).
"Copingrr & Skonr Jamrs <m Cofnnght. 11th ed. (1970), ss. 771-774; Nimmrr on C.opynght (1979). s. 8.04(c); 
Korman (1976) A.P.L.A. Bulletin 682 at 688.
“ 11-12 Geo. 5, c. 24, which came into forre January 1, 1924, and has been subjec t to only minor 
amendments since then.
244 U.N.B. LAW JOURNAL •  REVUE DE DROIT U.N.-B.
a statutory license. T he Compo case raised the im portant economic issue 
as to who needs to obtain this license when records are made, an issue 
which had to be resolved by the process of statutory construction.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A company named Canusa Records Inc. had caused the following 
things to be done without any license from the plaintiffs who owned the 
copyright in the work “There Goes My Everything.” A musical arrange­
ment o f the work was made in which the melody was copied. The lyrics 
were translated into French.13 Musical artists were engaged to perform 
the arrangem ent in this French version, and the performance was re­
corded on a master tape. The master tape was delivered to R.C.A. who 
prepared from it a master disc (or “acetate”). The master disc was given 
to Compo, a custom presser who, from the master disc, produced dies 
with which they pressed a quantity of copies which were delivered to 
Canusa or its distributor. Compo was being paid for these services by, 
or on behalf of, Canusa who arranged for their sale to the public. It was 
not the habit o f custom pressers to concern themselves with what was on 
the master disc or whether licenses had been or would be obtained from 
the owners of the mechanical rights.
The issue was: did such a presser “make any record” or, in the 
language o f the French version of the Act, “confectionner toute em- 
preinte”?
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
At the trial in the Federal Court o f Canada, Collier, J. concluded 
that all the foregoing steps constituted the “making of a record” by 
Canusa. No appeal was taken from this part of the decision.'4 However 
Collier, J. was persuaded that Compo had not made records within the 
meaning of the Copyright Act, nor had Compo “produced or reproduced 
the work”15 or a translation thereof. His reasoning was that one had to 
consider what was the “real” copying involved, and in his view this was
IJCopyright irt a work includes the sole right to produce, reproduce, perform  or publish any translation 
o f the work: Supra, footnote 1 at s. 3(1 )(a).
'*(1975) 17 C P R. (2d) 149. T here were other issues considered at the trial but not appealed; these will 
not lie leviewed here.
"T hese are the introductory words of s. 3(1), Copyright Act; Supra, footnote I.
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. .  . the taking o f  the music or melodic line o f  “There Goes My Every­
thing,” arranging the score, authorizing and directing a performer to produce 
or reproduce the melody or tune by instruments or voice, and having it 
permanently retained in some form — on the facts here, by means o f a master 
tape. Compo had nothing to do with producing or reproducing in that sense.
It merely performed a service in transposing what had been produced or 
reproduced on to a material which could be marketed bv those who had done 
what I have termed the real copying.
As to the right “to make any record” he said:
T he making o f  the offending records here was not, in my view, the 
pressing, but the earlier process carried out by the Canusa group.16
He referred  to what the position would have been had Canusa 
obtained a voluntary or a compulsory license to make records, a matter 
as to which Compo had made no inquiry. If there had been a license to 
Canusa, his Lordship’s view was that Compo would not be an infringer 
even if Canusa failed to pay royalties due under the license. If Compo 
could be branded a potential infringer, Compo should be able to take 
advantage o f the compulsory license provisions of s. 19, but his Lordship 
thought that Compo could not do so because s. 19 contemplates that the 
licensee not only makes but sells records, and Compo did not sell records 
and would therefore have no knowledge as to what royalties were to be 
paid.17
FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL
On appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal it was held, in brief 
reasons given by Jackett, C.J., that Compo had made records. There was 
no discussion of the reasons given by Collier, J. The Court of Appeal 
dealt with the issue as follows:
The appellants had the “sole right" to make the contrivances (records) in 
question and, without the appellants' permission, the respondent made them.
It is true that Canusa, which defendant started at an earlier stage in the 
course o f  events and arranged with the respondent to make the records, was 
also an infringer o f the appellants' right because it caused the respondent to 
make the records; however, the immediate tortfeaser is not exonerated from 
liability by reason o f  the liability o f  the various tortfeaser.
An examination o f  the record shows that what was done was done in the 
Province o f  Quebec but the matter was argued in the Trial Division and in 
this Court on the assumption that the principles applicable did not differ from 
the common law principles.18
’’s. 19(l)(ft), Copyright Act, Supra, footnote 1, requires the person who makes the records to pa\ 
royalties "in respect of all such contrivances sold by him."
'*Supra, footnote 14, at 160.
■*30 C.P.R. (2d) 14 at 16.
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SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
In the Supreme Court of Canada, Estey, J. delivered the reasons for 
judgm ent. Before his appointment to the bench he had been familiar 
with copyright matters and commercial reality. He found little assistance 
in the decision of the Court o f Appeal. He noted that the issue was not 
one of common law or property law but statutory law, and that it does 
not assist the interpretative analysis to import tort concepts.19 He did not 
find it necessary to decide whether Canusa made the records. Canusa 
had not appealed. If Compo made the records, Canusa might have 
authorized Compo’s act, but authorization is a separate violation of the 
statute.20
However the Supreme Court agreed with the result in the Court of 
Appeal. In discursive reasoning o f its own it found:
(1) There is a factual and commercial parallel between the record 
publisher (Canusa) and presser (Compo) and the publisher and printer 
of literary works; the printer has been held in England to be liable for 
reproducing a literary work, and the publisher separately liable for 
authorizing the printing.21 The fact that the printer would have no 
copyright, whereas a separate copyright might arise in the pressed re­
cord,22 vesting in Canusa,23 did not spoil the parallel in the view of the 
court.24
(2) U.S. decisions dealing with “manufacture” of records indicated 
to the Court that a presser may be regarded as a m anufacturer.25 So did 
Canadian taxing statutes. The Court found it easier to conclude that a 
record presser “makes” records than that he “manufactures” them .26
'•Also, Jackett, C.J.’s reference to vicarious liability was not the best choice of words, since it seems that 
Compo was an independent contractor.
20Supra, footnote 1, at s. 3(1).
*'Ash ft al v. Hutchinson & Co. (Publishers) Ltd. ft al (1936) 2 AU. E.R. 1496 (C.A.).
*tSupra, footnote I, at s. 4(3).
” Ibid., al ss. 10. 12(1).
,4It is o f interest, however, that the old cases in England and the United States have held that a record 
is not a “copy" o f a musical work: Copmger (J Skone James on Copyright, 11th ed (1971) s. 772.
“ The most recent U.S. Case considered by the Court was Leo Feist, Inc. et al v. Apollo Records et al (1969) 
300 F. Supp. 32, affd. (1969) 418 F. 2d 1249 (C.A. 2), cert, denied (1970) 398 U.S. 904. In Feist the 
presser was not a party, but the court held that Mastertone which prepared master tapes was not a 
“m anufacturer." Estey, J. seems to have considered a presser to be more like a m anufacturer because 
the presser is engaged in large scale production, though it seems that Mastertone played the more 
creative role.
“ However, as can be seen from note (8) above, the U.S. statute seems to have equated making and 
manufacturing.
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(3) Dictionary definitions of “m anufacture” and “make” were said to 
be consistent with the Court’s conclusion.
The Supreme Court was not persuaded by Collier, J .’s proposition 
that Canusa was the “real” maker.27 Collier, J had placed reliance on 
the compulsory licensing provisions in s. 19 but the Court said that 
examination of the workings of that section was digressive from the issue. 
In the view of the Court,
. . .  in the realities o f  commerce, the application o f this section is limited 
to the situation where the presser is the maker o f  the matrix or master.
The reasoning apparently is that the only person interested in a 
license under s. 19 would be someone who acquires copyright in the 
records produced pursuant to that section, and by s. 10 of the Act the 
person who acquires the copyright is the owner of the master (or his 
assignee), which Compo was not. Compo, who made no master, acquired 
no copyright, and sold no records, was held to be a record maker bui 
not a record maker for whom the Court thought s. 19 was designed.28
IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
OF CANADA
On the Supreme Court’s analysis, someone in the position of Compo 
is well advised either to go into the business of making masters as well 
as pressings, and obtain its own compulsory or voluntary licenses from 
the owners of mechanical rights, or ensure that whoever makes the 
master obtains a voluntary license which includes the right to have 
records pressed by an independent contractor like Compo. There is 
nothing in the statute to suggest that a licensee under s. 19 may assign
l7T he Court did nor discuss an argument that the scope of the mechanical right should be considered 
in the lighi of Article 13 of the Berne Convention, introduced in 1908 a( the Berlin revision and 
providing:
The authors o f musical works shall have the exclusive right of authorizing (1) (he adaptation 
of those works to instruments which can produce (hem mechanically; (2) the public perform aiue 
of the said works by means of those instruments.
The English Act of 1911 and (he Canadian Ac( provided for (he mechanical right in fulfillment ot 
this Convention obligation, which is now included in the Rome revision to which Canada has adhered 
(Schedule III to the Copyright Act). It was contended tha( (he "adaptation" to which the Convention 
refers requires more than pressing from a master made by someone else, and that "to make any record" 
should be construed as requiring more than pressing.
Nor did the Court discuss an argument based on the use in ss. 3, 4, 12 and 19 of derivatives of 
several different French verbs, “confectionner," “fabriquer," “faire,” “executer" and “creer,” whereas 
the English version uses the verb "make” in all those contexts.
" T h e  Australian view is (ha( a record presser is a manufacturer, and that a party in (he position of 
Canusa (Reader’s Diges() is no(, bu( (he Aus(ralian statute expressly provides for the case where the 
m anufacturer is not the person who sells to (he public, and also has a definition of when a record is 
made: R.C.A. Ltd. v. (Commissioner of Taxation (1977) 51 A.L.J.R. 602.
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his license or grant sublicenses to record pressers.29 Their Lordships 
suggested that Compo might protect itself contractually with whoever 
hires Compo, but if Compo is not satisfied about the ability of the 
Canusas of this world to defend it, or must do its own researches to try 
to ascertain whether any purported license comes from the owner of the 
mechanical rights, or must itself seek a license from such owner, the 
process of producing records may be slowed, costs may go up, and many 
small entrepreneurs in the position of Canusa may have problems in 
getting their records pressed by the few companies that have pressing 
facilities.30 This, of course, may be a necessary consequence if copyright 
owners are to be protected.
A point which the Court did not apparently consider is that records 
can be produced in a much simpler m anner than Canusa undertook to 
do. Instead of arranging the music and hiring musicians one may be a 
record or tape pirate and simply duplicate someone else’s record. This 
is a way of “making a record” for which no compulsory license is available 
in Canada,31 and it is not easily distinguishable from pressing copies.32
In obiter, Estey, J . said that no unauthorized exercise of the owner’s 
mechanical rights in a work can produce in the wrongdoer a copyright 
in the resultant record. This is a doubtful proposition. Section 4 of the 
Copyright Act provides that copyright “shall subsist” in certain works, 
and says nothing about whether the making of the works was authorized 
or unauthorized by owners of copyright in underlying works. This may 
be contrasted with the position in the United States where the current 
statute expressly provides that “protection for a work employing preex­
isting material in which copyright subsists does not extend to any part 
of the work in which such material has been used unlawfully.”33 To
**Cf Re Her Majesty and Fitzpatrick (1981), 29 O.R. (2d) 371 (Ont. C.A., patent license). T he question 
was considered but not decided in the High Court of Australia in R.C.A. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Taxation 
(1977) 51 A.L.J.R. 602. The position may be different with a consensual copyright license where the 
copyright owner does not rely on the skill o r reputation o f whoever may do the pressing: Edward B. 
Marks Music Corporation v. Fottllon (1949) 171 F. 2d. 905 and 908 (C.A.2). A licensee may employ agents, 
but merely to call someone an agent does not make him one: Howard and Bullough, Ld. v. TweedaUs and 
Smalley (1895) 12 R P C .  519 at 527-528 (Chitty, J.).
30On the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court there was Hied an affidavit of Terry 
Lynd, president of the Canadian Recording Industry Association and of CBS Records Canada Ltd. 
indicating that such consequences might follow, and stating as o f 1976 that approximately one-half of 
the records and tapes produced in Canada were custom manufactured for the account o f others. See 
also an affidavit of Alexander Muir filed on the application of CMRRA to intervene.
3ls. 19(3). It was held in numerous cases in the United States, even before legislation was introduced to 
confer copyright in a record, that tape pirates infringed the copyright in musical compositions under 
U.S. ss. 1(e) and 101(e), referred to in note (8) above: see, eg.. Fame Publishing Co. Inc. v. Alabama Custom 
Tape. Inc. (1975), 184 U.S.P.Q. 577 (C.A.5).
**Note also that the definition o f a “plate” in s. 2 refers to a matrix by which records are “made”: this 
clearly suggests that to press from a matrix is to make.
33I7 U.S.C. 102(a). T he U.S. Copyright Act o f 1909, s. 7, conditioned copyright upon obtaining the
consent o f the owner of copyright in the underlying work.
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make a compilation, or a derivative work such as an abridgment, adap­
tation, arrangem ent, dramatization or translation may infringe copyright, 
as may the making of a record or photograph. But it may also involve 
the exercise of considerable originality.34 W hether a court of equity will 
aid an infringer by enforcing his copyright is another question.35
Copyright cases have the peculiarity that they often deal with matters 
about which the public is curious, but the decisions themselves turn on 
dry statutory language and it usually takes a rather strong commercial 
or professional interest to force oneself to read them. The same must 
apply to writing the decisions, and it would be easy for a judge to say, 
with Diplock, L.J.:
Points o f  construction are short; judgm ents about them ought to be.38
However the Suprem e C ourt in its reasons in the Compo case 
explored fully the arguments that were made, and the parties could have 
no complaint that their arguments were not seriously considered. It is 
encouraging also that the Court was willing to study the legislation and 
cases from the United States, that prolific source of both copyright works 
and decisions about them.
W. L. HAYHURST, Q.C.*
3iGramophone Company Limited v. Stephen Cawardme and Company, (1934) 1 Ch. 450 at 455 (Maugham, J.).
54These issues are discussed in Coptnger & Shone James on Copyright, 11th ed. (1971), ss. 145-149, and in 
Lahore on Intellectural Property in Australia, Copyright (1977) ss. 340-343. A similar issue arises with respect 
to obscene and other imprudent works: Copinger, ss. 224-228; Lahore, s. 339; Goldsmith, "Sex and 
The Copyright Lawyer" (1967) P.T.l.C. Proceedings 167; but it may be questioned whether even an 
equitable defence should be available: Mitchell Brothers Film Groups v. Cinema Adult Theatre (1979), 203 
U.S.P.Q. 1041 (C.A. 5).
3*Reymes-Cole Elite, (1965) R.P.C. 102 at 155.
•O f Ridout & Maybee, Toronto. Lecturer in Industrial Property, Faculty o f Law, University of Toronto.
